The Prestige Heuristic as an Instrument of Epistemic Manipulation

By Glênio S Guedes

The Dangerous Role of the Bad Scientist in a Democratic Society

For a long time, it was widely assumed that the greatest threat to democracy was ignorance. Merchants of Doubt, by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, forces us to revise that comfortable belief. The more serious danger is not ignorance itself, but misguided knowledge armed with authority. The central figure in this new landscape is not the confused layperson, but the displaced expert: the scientist who speaks outside his field, the specialist who lends academic prestige to causes that have already lost their empirical foundation. Thus emerges the figure of the bad scientist—not the crude fraudster, but the sophisticated operator of doubt.

This figure does not challenge science openly. On the contrary, he claims to speak in its name. And it is precisely this claim that gives his discourse its peculiar force.

I. Prestige as a Substitute for Argument

Human reasoning relies, unavoidably, on cognitive shortcuts. Among them is a powerful one: the prestige heuristic. When a speaker is recognized as an authority, the listener’s critical scrutiny is substantially reduced. This heuristic is not, in itself, a flaw. Social life would be impossible if every claim had to be reassessed from first principles.

The problem arises when this mechanism is deliberately exploited. In public debate, credentials often matter more than method. The lay public does not intuitively distinguish a nuclear physicist from a climatologist, or an acclaimed researcher in one domain from a novice in another. Authority, once acquired, tends to “spill over” across disciplines. Prestige becomes detached from its epistemic source and begins to function as a free-floating sign of credibility.

II. From Scientific Error to Epistemic Sabotage

It is essential to distinguish between two very different phenomena. Scientific error is an integral part of intellectual progress; epistemic manipulation, by contrast, aims to prevent knowledge from stabilizing at all. The actors described by Oreskes and Conway are not interested in winning scientific debates. Their objective is to keep them permanently unresolved, even when a robust consensus has already been achieved.

From an epistemic standpoint, this represents a serious mutation. Science ceases to be a practice oriented toward provisional truth and becomes a rhetorical resource for political paralysis. Doubt is no longer a method of inquiry; it is a strategic commodity.

III. The Bad Scientist as a Political Actor

The bad scientist does not operate primarily in the laboratory, but in the public arena. He understands something fundamental: democracy depends on epistemic trust. Public policies require prediction, risk assessment, and a minimal acceptance of technical consensus. By undermining that trust, the bad scientist does not merely dissent; he destabilizes the cognitive environment in which collective decisions must be made. He offers no better alternative—only enough confusion to block action.

IV. False Symmetry and the Collapse of Criteria

One of the most effective tools of this strategy is the distortion of journalistic balance. When opposing views are given equal space, the reader infers that there must be a legitimate controversy. What disappears is the epistemic asymmetry between them: differences in evidentiary support, methodological rigor, and disciplinary consensus. Democratic deliberation is then reduced to a contest between performances of authority rather than an evaluation of reasons.

V. Why the Bad Scientist Is More Dangerous than the Ordinary Denier

The ordinary denier convinces few and radicalizes many. The bad scientist, by contrast, appears moderate. He speaks the language of prudence. He calls for “more studies” when the evidence is already overwhelming. He does not deny outright; delay is his form of denial.

From a cognitive perspective, this is particularly corrosive. It reduces cognitive dissonance, preserves political identities, and allows inaction without moral cost. Doubt, in this context, does not disturb conscience—it soothes it.

VI. Democratic Responsibility and the Ethics of Expertise

A normative question therefore arises: does freedom of scientific expression include the freedom to deliberately disorganize the public epistemic space? This is not a call for censorship, but for epistemic responsibility, especially where conflicts of interest, hidden funding, or systematic misuse of authority are present. A democracy that fails to protect its criteria of rational decision-making becomes hostage to those most skilled at manipulating doubt.

Conclusion

Merchants of Doubt reveals a troubling truth: science can be weaponized against the very idea of truth when its credentials are severed from its methods. The bad scientist does not destroy democracy by shouting lies, but by whispering doubts with an authoritative voice. Resisting this phenomenon requires epistemic literacy, a journalism less obsessed with symmetry and more attentive to criteria, and above all a refusal to confuse prestige with truth. The decisive question, in the end, is not scientific but political: who should be allowed to confuse, when the cost of confusion is borne by all?